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The serious financial crisis, which started in 2007 in the heart of ca-
pitalism, and became widespread throughout the world in 2008, is
still unfolding with important structural repercussion and transfor-
mations. Such transformations are already taking place, for example,
in financial systems, be it because of the impacts of the crisis itself
– which caused a greater concentration of assets in various markets
– or because of new regulations in the financial sector that have
been put in place multilaterally in many different countries, as well
as new strategies being adopted by capitalist agents in this new
context. This article aims at plotting and analyzing some of the most
important transformations taking place in financial systems since
the beginning of the crisis, focusing on the banking systems of
the US and the European Union. In addition to a brief introduction,
this paper is divided into five sections. In the first section, the main
transformations that the US and European banking systems went
through before the crisis are analyzed. Section two discusses the
crisis’ effects on the concentration found in the American and Eu-
ropean banking systems. The following section highlights some ele-
ments of the crisis that have affected the process of
internationalization by banks, again focusing on the US and Eu-
rope. Section four analyzes the new regulation and supervision
measures that started to surface in the two aforementioned eco-
nomic regions, as well as their potential impact on the system as a
whole. The last section is dedicated to final comments, featuring re-
flections about where the world financial system is headed after the
crisis.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis that has affected the world for almost eight
years is unveiling its newest feature. After the subprime collapse of
2007, and the bankruptcy of major banks in 2008 such as Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers, the crisis worsened and there was need for
decisive action by Central Banks and governments around the world
after financial markets all but came to a complete halt1.
In early 2009, uncertainty was decreasing but overall confidence
in the system still had not been restored, thus hindering the growth
of central economies and keeping the supply of credit from expan-
ding. In 2009, the crisis expanded to the European Union and espe-
cially to the Euro Zone. Many countries, such as Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain, began having trouble financing themselves
in the market, since their long-term bonds’ interest rates had gone
up significantly. This increase in interest rates originated in the ge-
neral aversion to risk, which affected European financial institutions.
In this scenario, markets began asserting more risk to economies wi-
thin the Euro Zone that featured structural imbalances, but had no
problem financing such imbalances up to the beginning of the crisis
(Carvalho, 2012).
In the first half of 2012, expectations became less pessimistic, pri-
marily because of vigorous actions taken by the European Central
Bank (ECB) under newly-instated president Mario Draghi2. Howe-
ver, both the Euro Zone and the United States have yet to show signs
of a robust economic recovery.
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1 Ocampo (2010) provides a timeline to the crisis, which serves as a reference and star-
ting point to the timeline we proposed in this article.
2 By the end of 2011, the ECB initiated the Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO)
programme, which focused on addressing concerns markets had about certain banks’
liquidity, by lending almost unlimited sums to almost any European bank on very easy
terms, for much longer than ever before. In a speech given in June of 2012, Mario Draghi
– who became the President of the European Central Bank in November of 2011 – poin-
ted out that the ECB would continue to provide market liquidity for banks as needed
(Draghi, 2012). In July of 2012, the ECB’s President (Draghi, 2012b) pointed in the same
direction: the continuity of standard and non-standard monetary-policy measures by
the ECB, indicating a broad commitment to tackle the crisis.
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In the years following the crisis, some very important transfor-
mations have taken place, especially in the financial systems, which
have faced structural and regulatory shifts. Such transformations are
already affecting the way financial institutions do business, both do-
mestically and internationally.
In this article, we will discuss the main transformations that US
and European – mainly, the Euro Zone – financial markets went
through since the beginning of the crisis3. The paper is divided into
five sections. In the first section, the main transformations that the
US and European banking systems went through before the
crisis are analyzed. Section two discusses the crisis’ effects on the
concentration found in the American and European banking sy-
stems. The following section highlights some elements of the crisis
that have affected the process of internationalization by banks, again
focusing on the US and Europe. Section four analyzes the new re-
gulation and supervision measures that started to surface in the two
aforementioned economic regions, as well as their potential impact
on the system as a whole. The last section is dedicated to final com-
ments, featuring reflections about where the world financial system
is headed after the crisis.  
2. Transformations in the financial system prior to the crisis
2.1 United States of America
Traditional literature sorts financial systems according to the role
their financial institutions play in the market, and by how the agents
finance themselves. Therefore, systems are considered either bank-
based or market-based. However, the current financial environment
makes it extremely difficult to keep sorting financial systems in that
way, especially the US financial system. Banks have played an in-
creased role in the capital markets, especially since the 2000s. Even
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though the importance of deposits has diminished from the 1990s
onwards, banks are still the institutions driving the financial system.
They have increased the concession of credit by using capital mar-
kets to leverage themselves through derivatives and securitization.
Bank funding through money markets has steadily increased, and
the services provided are the ones that generate fees.
The current US financial system is better defined as “market-
based banking” (Hardie and Howarth, 2011). In such system, risks
are amplified and end up staying within the financial institutions
since other banks in proprietary trading buy the bank-issued secu-
rities. Those securities in turn are used as collateral for funding
through the short-term market (Financial Services Authority, 2009).
The break up of the regulatory structure that had defined the US
financial system since the 1930s was the paramount factor behind
the transformation of the system, especially from the early 1980s on-
ward. This deregulation involved the end of i) Regulation Q in 1980,
which put a cap on the interest rate that depositary institutions could
pay on customers’ deposits; ii) the MacFadden Act in 1994, a law put
in place in 1927 that prevented banks from having operations out-
side their state and iii) the Glass Steagal Act in 1999, enacted in the
United States in the 1930s, separating traditional banking activities
from investment banking ones in order to avoid contamination bet-
ween institutions and the consequent contagion. It was repealed in
1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which allowed the formation of
large financial conglomerates with various areas of operation. The
result was a considerable consolidation of the US financial system,
especially during the 1990s. In 1988, there were approximately 13,400
banks in the US. This figure dropped to about 8,000 in the beginning
of the 2000s. At the same time, the number of branches went up from
40,000 in 1980 to more than 60,000 in the 2000s, showing the logic of
the expansion of US financial system: bigger and fewer banks with
more branches (Heintz & Pollin, 2013).
The new environment featured an ever-increasing role for insti-
tutional investors, who became the drivers of financial innovations
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created by the big financial conglomerates4. Such innovations set the
tone for the structural and institutional transformations experienced
by the US financial system in the last decades.
An important change in the world financial system, particularly
in the banking system, was the introduction, in the late 1980s, of new
prudential regulation standards outlined in the Basel Agreement.
The Agreement instituted a worldwide standard of regulation,
aimed at leveling the playing field for banking institutions. Its main
objective was not to ban banks from performing operations, but in-
stead, each operation would have an onus proportional to its risk.
The idea of capital requirements adjusted according to the risk borne
by assets was therefore introduced as the main pillar of prudential
regulation.
In fact, regarding prudential regulation, the Basel I Agreement
of 1988, which was implemented internationally, can be considered
a milestone. It had as its centrepiece setting minimum capital requi-
rements for banks. Basel I was primarily focused on credit risk, and
banks’ assets were classified and grouped in fixed categories accor-
ding to that risk, as determined by the regulator.
After a series of changes to the first Agreement, in 2004 Basel II
was published. It retained the previous basic proposition, namely,
that the key to ensure the soundness of the system would be to main-
tain adequate capital relatively to assets’ size and quality (risk). Ho-
wever, important innovations were put in place regarding the risks
faced by the system (not only credit risk, but also market and ope-
rational risks) and how to measure them. The Basel II Accord was
not fully adopted by regulatory authorities around the world when
the financial crisis intensified and spread out internationally.
In order to minimize costs created by the implementation of the
Basel Agreements, as well as to enhance credit concession, banks un-
precedentedly began concentrating the majority of their risks in in-
stitutions outside their balance sheet, creating what has been known
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instruments with a higher return than those attached to treasury bonds.
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as the shadow banking system. Other institutions used this parallel
system to increase their leverage, working with derivatives and
being the counterpart in banking operations. The US financial sy-
stem was structurally changing, featuring an increasing number of
non-banking institutions participating in financial intermediation,
such as funds and off-balance-sheet entities. Such institutions were
widely using short-term monetary markets to fund themselves, ele-
vating the system-wide risk since the instruments in this market are
susceptible to bank runs (IMF, 2012). For instance, the asset-backed
commercial papers (ABCP) market was one of the first to collapse
during the crisis, since it was the instrument used by the shadow-
banking institutions for funding.
2.2 European Union
An analysis of the dynamics of the EU’s financial system, al-
though part of the shift of global capitalism in the last decades, has
to take into account the particularities of integration within the
Union. During the Union’s lengthy process of growth and integra-
tion, started in the 1950s, two crucial moments have to be highli-
ghted regarding financial consolidation: the creation of the Single
Financial Market, in 1993, and the introduction of the Euro, in 1999.
According to Salgado (2010), the creation of the Single Financial
Market in 1993 brought about the legislative and regulatory envi-
ronment that led to the emergence of a European Banking Industry,
featuring a genuinely consolidated banking system within the
Union. The goal was to allow banks to operate freely in any member
nation, thus increasing competition and benefitting European busi-
ness and families.
Three principles guided the formation of a single or integrated
banking market in the European Union (Murphy, 2000). The first one
was that the member nation would keep its regulation and supervi-
sion agencies, which entailed fragmentation of power in that task.
The second principle, derived from the first, stated that there should
be a minimum level of harmonization of regulation, more restrictive
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than the individual national levels. That meant nations would have
their own rules, supervisory and regulatory entities, as long as a mi-
nimum level of standardization among EU nations was assured. 
In fact, as stated by Wahl (2010), too much intervention would
be considered harmful, since the process was to be market-led. The-
refore, the supervisory and regulatory set-up was extremely frag-
mented. However, the increase in financial consolidation, especially
after the introduction of the Euro, and the deepening of the financial
crisis, brought to light the inconsistency of the first two principles.
The supervision in place proved to be inadequate, since it did not
prevent regulatory arbitrage by financial institutions that were crea-
ted by differences in rules and supervisory procedures among na-
tions (Geus, 2012).
The third principle that guided the implementation of a single
banking market, according to Murphy (2000), was that its rules were
to be implemented by directives issued by the European Union. Im-
portant aspects in the integration model adopted were the concepts
of mutual recognition and the single passport. The mutual recogni-
tion concept advocates that banks are to be regulated by their coun-
try of origin and should follow such regulation when doing business
in another member country. According to such concept, the regula-
ting authority in the “host” nation accepts the primacy of the regu-
lating authority from where the institution originally derived
(Murphy, 2000, p. 4). The single passport concept means that a bank
that is authorized to operate in a nation member of the European
Union is automatically authorized to operate in any other member
nation, either via a branch, a subsidiary, or via the acquisition of ano-
ther bank, or any other way. Therefore, the “host” nation cannot im-
pose any barriers affecting the operation of such a bank.   This
environment allows banks from nations with looser regulation to
operate in other nations in any way they find to be more advanta-
geous, even performing activities that native banks are not allowed
to perform, taking advantage of the lax regulatory apparatus of the
country from where they originate. Therefore, as stated by Murphy
(2000, p. 4), the principles of mutual recognition and single passport
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were established to create an incentive for the universal bank con-
cept to become the norm within the EU, as well as to stimulate ef-
fective capital integration and the consolidation in the banking
sector. 
However, up to the creation of the Euro in 1999, cross-border
operations within the EU were still subject to the risk of currency
mismatches, as well as the cost of doing transactions in different cur-
rencies. In fact, the introduction of the Euro was another step of pa-
ramount importance to the intensification of the financial and
banking integration within the European Union. According to Sal-
gado (2010), the creation of a single financial market (1993), as well
as the unveiling of the Euro (1999), stimulated the development
and/or consolidation of large financial institutions, with operations
in the entire EU.
The period ranging from 1990 to 2001 was marked by intense
merging and acquisition activities in the financial sector5, which led
to a greater concentration within the area, especially from 1996 on.
According to Salgado (2010), throughout those 11 years, approxima-
tely 15,500 companies in the financial sector were subject to change
in ownership.
One of the characteristics of such movement is the intertwining
of banking and insurance companies, with a growing number of
banks in the EU combining the two activities – commercial banking
and insurance – in their core, with insurance products being offered
in their network of commercial banking branches. Such movement
has been described by the term bank-insurance. Some of the biggest
bank-insurance conglomerates were created during this period, such
and Allianz-Dresdner, Fortis, and ING, among others (Salgado, 2010,
p. 247).
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According to Salgado (2010), in addition to the bank-insurance
model, two other approaches were adopted by European banks in
their quest for expansion and in order to adapt to a new business
environment: “pure-play” investment banks, as well as the traditio-
nal universal banking.
The so-called investment banks’ pure-players specialized them-
selves in advisory and in capital-market operations (stocks and trea-
sury notes). Even though they were smaller in size and subject to
the intense competition from US investment banks (Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch) before the crisis,
some of the bigger institutions within the EU had consolidated
themselves in the market, such as Deutsche Bank6 (Salgado, 2010).
Universal banks’ activities, on the other hand, are based on per-
sonal relationships with clients, especially individuals and small bu-
sinesses, to whom products and services are offered (various credit
options, insurance, asset management, etc.). Therefore, a far-rea-
ching, extensive network is required. This is the predominant model
currently in place in the European Union. According to Salgado
(2010), British banks were the first to adopt such model, followed by
the Dutch, and in a smaller-scale, the French.
However, it should be noted that the consolidation of the ban-
king system in the European Union throughout the 1990s, was
mainly a domestic process. Because of mergers and acquisitions,
some large national banks were created, such as BSCH and BBVA in
Spain; Banca Intesa, UniCredit, and Sao Paolo IMI in Italy; BHV in
Germany; and BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais, in
France. In its next step, after the introduction of the Euro, the move-
ment marginally shifted towards an increasing number of cross-bor-
der operations inside the EU (Salgado, 2010, p.250).
At a national level, according to Salgado (2010), the percentage
of the banking sector that was controlled by the five biggest banks,
measured in total assets, rose from 37.9% in 1980 to 57.1% in 1999.
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However, one can notice an important difference in the different
groups of countries inside the Union. In smaller countries, the five
biggest banks had over 50% of all banking assets. In some of those
nations, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium,
the five biggest banks held over 75% of the sector’s assets.
On the other hand, in a few other countries, such as the UK and
Germany, this indicator was less then 30%. In fact, the EU’s three big-
gest economies (Germany, France, and the UK) have banking sectors
that feature relatively small concentration, with Germany boosting
the least concentration of all EU nations (Salgado, 2010, p. 250, 251).
3. Bank Concentration After the Crisis
3.1 United States of America
Ever since deregulation of the US financial system started, in the
1980s, mergers and acquisitions became more frequent, thus making
the system concentrated around a few large institutions.
Graph 1 shows that the concentration of banking assets in the lar-
gest US banks, which was already increasing before the crisis, grew
after the crisis, especially from 2009 to 2010, both in the five and in the
three biggest bank groups. In 2006, the five biggest banks held 28.01%
of total assets, while in 2010 this share had gone up to 39.87% – an in-
crease of almost 43%. This significant growth in the volume of assets
held by the largest banks was a result of various movements during
that period, such as: 1) mergers and acquisitions, many times encou-
raged and/or financed by the Federal Reserve (Fed); 2) the authori-
zation for investment banks to turn into bank holdings, therefore
becoming part of concentration statistics; 3) the liquidation of small
banks. From the beginning of the crisis until December 2012, 483 ban-
king institutions have failed, according to data released by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Table 1 below displays the main mergers and acquisitions that
took place since the beginning of the crisis, in 2007. According to
Dymski (2012), banking deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s helped
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some medium-sized and some regional banks to become big players
in the US financial system, such as Wachovia and Washington Mu-
tual: “[…] these banks’ balance sheets were supported not just by
deposits, but also by liquid money-market funds. And these banks
were as dependent, as were money-center banks, on the judgment
of the financial marketplace – and as vulnerable as reversals of opi-
nion therein” (Dymski, 2012, p. 218).
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GRAPH 1
Bank Concentration in the United States - 51 and 32 biggest banks,
from 2006 to 2010, in %
1 Assets held by the five biggest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
2 Assets held by the three biggest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
Source: World Bank, Global Development Financial Database.
TABLE 1
Major bank mergers and acquisitions in the US after 2007
Bank of New York Company Merged with Mellon Financial Corporation in 2007
National City Corporation Acquired by PNC Financial in 2008
Wachovia Corporation Acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008
Countrywide Financial Corporation Acquired by Bank of America in 2008
Bear Sterns Acquired by JP Morgan Chase in 2008
Merrill Lynch Acquired by Bank of America in 2008
Washington Mutual Acquired by JP Morgan Chase in 2008
Source: table made by authors based on Dymski (2012).
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The first major institution that began showing signs of being af-
fected by the crisis was Bear Stearns, which was deeply involved in
the negotiation of subprime mortgages. Its investment funds began
featuring losses in July 2007. In December 2007, the bank showed its
first quarterly loss ever, a US$ 854 million loss in the fourth quarter.
In March of 2008, Bear Stearns was acquired by JP Morgan Chase,
with a US$ 30 billion aid from the Fed7. Before that, in January of
2008, Countrywide Financial had already been bought by Bank of
America.
Instability in the financial system continued throughout 2008,
with money markets all but drying up. In such context, funds that
were financed by money markets and dealt with subprime mort -
gage-backed security bonds, such as the CDOs (collateralized debt
obligations) had to be taken over and their losses absorbed, thus af-
fecting the largest American banks.
September 2008 was the most eventful time in the crisis, with: i)
the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, on 14; ii) the
bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers and the subse-
quent denial of help by the Fed, on 15; iii) a 10-day bank run against
Washington Mutual, the biggest Savings & Loans in the US at the
time, which went bankrupt and was acquired by JP Morgan Chase,
on 15; iv) the green-light for two mega investment banks, Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, to become bank holdings and therefore
subject to regulation by the Fed, on 21; v) and the acquisition of Wa-
chovia by Wells Fargo, which was finalized on 3 October, 2008.
Those transformations in the structure of the US financial system
made the biggest banks even bigger. With the exception of Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley, the total assets held by the big-
gest American banks increased significantly. Between 2007 and 2011,
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of the recession. By facilitating assets’ restructuring process, recapitalization stop “zom-
bie banks” (those with bad loans on their assets) from dominating the recovery.
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JP Morgan’s assets increased by approximately 47%; Bank of Ame-
rica’s, by 26%; Wells Fargo’s, by an astonishing 139%; Metlife’s8, by
52%; Us Bancorp, by 48%; Bank of New York Mellon’s, by 72%; and
PNC Financial’s, by 117%.
On the one hand, the crisis made it clear that some institutions
were too-big-to-fail, so much that they are subject to additional ca-
pital requirements in the most recent prudential regulation propo-
sals. On the other hand, as one can note above, the crisis sparked a
concentration of capital in the banking sector. Therefore, the concern
about too-big-to-fail institutions has been taken to new heights,
given the size and the importance of some banks, and with new in-
stitutions joining the too big to fail category. The Financial Stability
board published in 2011 a list of banks considered “systemically re-
levant” which will be required to have a larger amount of capital re-
lative to assets. Among the 29 institutions on the list, 8 are from the
US: i) Bank of America, ii) Bank of New York Mellon, iii) Citigroup,
iv) Goldman Sachs, v) JP Morgan Chase, vi) Morgan Stanley, vii)
Wells Fargo, and viii) State Street. It is paradoxical that the very crisis
and the ensuing bailout of troubled institutions ended up stimula-
ting capital concentration.
In fact, there are other questions concerning too-big-to-fail insti-
tutions beyond the effective instability they bring into the sector. One
of them is related to the fact that they have too much power (Joh-
nson, 2012), enough to manipulate indexes in their favour as Bar-
clays did with the LIBOR rate9. Concentration also allows banks to
charge more for services and loans, despite being able to increase
their efficiency by scale-and-scope economies (IMF, 2012).
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bank holdings, the company has announced that it will likely sell its bank-deposit sector
to General Electric Capital, thus leaving the bank-holding category and going back to
focusing on its insurance activities. Thus, the institution seeks to avoid strict regulation
by the Fed regarding reserves and capital requirements (Bloomberg, 2012).
9 In June 2012, an international story broke out about a scandal involving the manipu-
lation of the LIBOR interest rate by Barclays. The LIBOR rate was used as a reference
for many loan contracts around the world, including mortgages.
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3.2 European Union
Throughout 2008 and 2009, as the crisis unfolded and later dee-
pened, various financial institutions in the European Union reported
significant losses and many were subject to restructuring. In that
context, some institutions were acquired by competitors; others were
nationalized, in a very complex process. As well pointed out by Sal-
gado (2010), such restructuring events were not isolated nor parti-
cular: the crisis, originated in the US subprime-mortgage market,
generated losses for almost all the major financial institutions in the
biggest economies in the European Union.
The nationalization of the British mortgage bank Northern Rock,
in February of 2008, kicked off the process. Salgado (2010) reminds
us that this event sparked the first bank run in the UK in over 100
years. In July of 2008, the Danish Central Bank announced an inter-
vention on Roskilde Bank. One month later, after having a difficult
time finding a buyer, the Danish Central Bank announced the pur-
chase of Roskilde.
According to Salgado (2010), the period of greatest turbulence
in European financial markets took place at the end of 2008, from
September onwards. In that month, British bank Lloyds TSB was for-
ced to take over Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS). By the end of
2008, many other institutions had come down with serious pro-
blems, having been subject to some sort of intervention in order to
be immediately restructured. Among them were Bradford & Bingley
in the UK, Hypo Real Estate in Germany, and Fortis and Dexia in
the Low Countries.
A clearer picture of the global financial meltdown emerged in
April 2009, when the IMF published in its Global Financial Stability
Report that the total losses in the worldwide financial system had
been US$ 4.1 Trillion, and that the majority of the losses occurred in
Europe (US$1.4 Trillion), and not in the United States of America
(US$ 1 Trillion).
Table 2 below shows some of the main interventions that took
place in the European Union in 2008.
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Schoenmaker (2011) analyzes how the crisis affected the concen-
tration in the European banking system. Between 2006 and 2009, the
number of banks in the EU went from 8,507 to 8,358. That figure
would be even lower (7,938) – thus indicating more concentration10
– if we do not take into consideration a reclassification of the credit
institutions carried out by Ireland.
On the other hand, the volume of assets held by the 30 largest
banks11 in Europe was 6% lower in 2009 when compared to 2007.
However, as the author points out, there are clearly winners and lo-
sers in this process. Among the losers – institutions that experienced
the greatest decrease in assets – are: RBS (UK), Lloyds (UK), Deutsch
(Germany), Commerzbank (Germany), and ABN Amro (Nether-
lands). Among the winners are BNP Paribas (France), Santander
(Spain), Banque Populaire CdE (France), Nordea (Sweden), and
Standard Chartered (UK).
Data presented by Schoenmaker (2011) for the years 2006
through 2009 show a general tendency of an increase in banking con-
centration inside the EU, no matter what parameter is chosen12. Ho-
BANKING-SYSTEM TRANSFORMATIONS AFTER THE CRISIS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON REGULATION
91JEEH • 2/2015
10 The author presents two methods of measuring concentration in the banking sector:
the market share of the five biggest banks (CR5), measured by the volume of assets,
and the Herfindahl index, defined by the sum of the square of the market share (asset
volume) of all banks in the sector. The data presented is relative to the market share of
the five largest banks (CR5).
11 Selected by using the Tier 1 capital criteria in 2009, as published by The Banker.
12 The source of the original data presented by Schoenmaker (2010) are European Cen-
tral Bank’s reports (2007 and 2010).
TABLE 2




United Kingdom Northern Rock, RBS, HBOS, Bradford & Bingley
Netherlands ING
Denmark Roskilde
Source: made by authors based on Salgado (2010) and IMF (2009).
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wever, data also shows that there is an important difference in con-
centration levels among EU nations, both before and after the crisis.
That remains true even if we compare the original 15 member na-
tions to the new member nations.
As previously noted, in economies such as Germany, France, and
the UK, the banking sector features relatively little concentration.
Germany, for instance, has the least-concentrated banking sector of
all EU nations. However, a shift towards more concentration is no-
ticeable in Germany after the crisis, from 2006 to 2009. The market
share of the five largest German banks went from 22% to 25%13 in
that period.
A similar shift can be observed in data provided by the World
Bank14 encompassing the period from 2006 to 2010 – graph 2. The
data shows that there is an increase in asset-concentration levels in
the period, both for the three and for the five largest German banks.
The two indicators show a slight decrease in concentration in 2009,
followed by another increase in 2010.
The United Kingdom, featuring a slightly higher concentration
level than Germany, also showed an increased concentration of as-
sets in the largest banks after the crisis: concentration levels went
from 36% in 2006 to 41% in 2009 (Schoenmaker, 2011).
Data presented by the World Bank for the years ranging from
2006 to 2010 show that the market in the UK behaved in a manner
that was similar to Germany’s – graph 3. Concentration increased
both for the five and for the three largest banks.
In France, however, an opposite tendency was observed accor-
ding to data provided by the European Central Bank, presented by
Schoenmaker (2011): the concentration of assets in the five largest
banks fall from 52% in 2006, to 47% in 200915.
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13 Incidentally, the number of Banks in Germany also decreased in that period, going
from 2,050 in 2006 to 1,948 in 2009.
14 Global Development Financial Database. The same database was used to analyze the
US case (Graph 1).
15 A similar movement is described by the variations in the Herfindahl index, presented
in Schoenmaker (2011).
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GRAPH 2
Bank Concentration in Germany - 51 and 32 largest banks,
from 2006 to 2010, in %
1 Assets held by the 5 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
2 Assets held by the 3 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
Source: World Bank, Global Development Financial Database.
GRAPH 3
Bank Concentration in the UK - 51 and 32 largest banks,
from 2006 to 2010, in %
1 Assets held by the 5 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
2 Assets held by the 3 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
Source: World Bank, Global Development Financial Database.
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It should be noted that all of the Countries mentioned above have
large banking institutions such as the German Deutsche Bank, the Bri-
tish HSBC and RBS, and the French BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole.
On the other hand, nations such as Belgium, Finland, and the
Nonetheless, data presented by the World Bank shows a diffe-
rent Picture – graph 4. As one can note in the graph below, after a
slight reduction of concentration levels in 2007 and 2008, there was
a slight increase in 2009 and 201016.
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16 Differences found in concentration data presented by the European Central Bank
(Schoenmaker, 2011) and by the World Bank (Global Development Financial Database)
are explained by the methods used to build and harmonize statistics. They can explain
the different results obtained for France in the analyzed period. An in-depth investiga-
tion of the database methodologies, as well as of the specific events that took place in
the French financial system, are needed to better analyze this case.
GRAPH 4
Bank Concentration in France - 51 and 32 largest Banks,
from 2006 to 2010, in %
1 Assets held by the 5 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
2 Assets held by the 3 largest banks in relation to the total assets held by commercial banks.
Source: World Bank, Global Development Financial Database.
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Netherlands have much more concentrated markets. However, the
crisis did not define a single shift for those countries: while the Ne-
therlands and Finland featured data indicating17 either a relative sta-
bility or an ever-so slight increase in concentration, data shows
Belgium experienced a lower level of concentration after the crisis.
Schoenmaker (2011) makes some relevant remarks regarding the
use of indexes. The author claims that for distinct segments of the
banking system, their relevant markets are different geographically.
For retail banks, which deal with families and small-to-medium bu-
sinesses, concentration should in fact be measured at a national level
since that is the scope of their business. Wholesale banks, on the
other hand, deal with large corporations, making the entire Euro-
pean market relevant to them. Finally, investment banks deal on a
worldwide level.
Therefore, considering the European Union, it would not feature
relevant bank-concentration according to data presented by Scho-
enmaker (2011). Among European banks, the French BNP Paribas
had the largest regional market share in 2009 (4%). Another French
institution came in second, Crédit Agricole (3.6%)18. In third place
was the British Royal Bank of Scotland (3.4%). The five largest EU
Banks had 16% of the market share, which is a relatively low figure,
despite the presence of large institutions.
Taking into consideration individual countries, the comparison
– made possible by data released by the World Bank – for the United
States, Germany, The United Kingdom, and France (Graphs 1
through 4) shows that European Nations feature larger concentra-
tion than the United States.
It should also be noted that on the list of the 29 systemically re-
levant banks released by the Financial Stability Board in 2011 are 15
banks in the European Union19. They are: i) Banque Populaire CdE
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17 Numbers presented by Schoenmaker (2011) derived from ECB data.
18 It should be noted that the Bank of America, the largest banking institution in the
US, holds a 10% share of the American market.
19 The remaining banks are eight American, three Japanese, two Swiss, and one Chi-
nese.
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(France); ii) Barclays (United Kingdom); iii) BNP Paribas (France);
iv) Commerzbank (Germany); v) Deutsche Bank (Germany); vi)
Dexia (Belgium); vii) Group Crédit Agricole (France); viii) HSBC
(United Kingdom); ix) ING Bank (Netherlands); x) Lloyds Banking
Group (United Kingdom); xi) Nordea (Sweden); xii) Royal Bank of
Scotland (United Kingdom); xiii) Santander (Spain); xiv) Société Gé-
nérale (France); xv) UniCredit Group (Italy).
4. Impact of the crisis on the internationalization of financial
institutions
4.1 United States of America
When it comes to the internationalization of American banks and
their presence outside of the US, slight changes can be noted since the
beginning of the crisis. Data provided by the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) regarding foreign claims, which includes loans,
bonds, and stock-market participation in subsidiaries, show that
banks’ international exposure barely changed. Despite a slight drop
in 2008, activities of US Banks outside the country in 2012 remained
at the same level they were in 2006 (pre-crisis), as shown in graph 5.
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GRAPH 5
Consolidated foreign claims - US Banks - 2006 to 2012
Source: Bank of International Settlements.
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3.2 European Union
The predominantly domestic consolidation that took place in the
European Union was in some ways disappointing. The expectations
were that, after the creation of a single financial market and a single
currency, de facto regional players would shape the sector. Up to the
crisis, most of the mergers and acquisitions that took place across
borders were limited in terms of both size and geographic reach. In
addition, these happened frequently with both parties being from
areas with historic and cultural ties.
Looking at Table 3 containing an UNCTAD ranking of the most
trans-nationalized financial institutions, one can note that some large
American institutions increased their international presence by
buying banks that were more internationalized – as did Bank of
America, when it acquired Merrill Lynch. Morgan Stanley and Gol-
dman Sachs increased their international presence, and JP Morgan
Chase fell in the ranking. In that sense, the United States has emer-
ged from the crisis with an increasing importance among the major
global players.
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20 The Unctad ranking features the 50 most internationalized financial institutions in
the world, both banking and non-banking. On Table 3, only the most internationalized
banking institutions are displayed, among the group of all financial institutions.
TABLE 3












Citigroup Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 2
JP Morgan Chase & Company 21 24 29 35 34 37
Morgan Stanley 32 32 32 15 17 18
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 33 34 33 38 31 26
Bank of America n/a n/a n/a 27 29 39
Source: The top 50 financial TNCs - unctad.org.
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According to Salgado (2010, p. 252), in addition to well-known bar-
riers to operations across borders – such as cultural and legal differen-
ces, along with a lack of knowledge about specific local markets – in
some cases there was strong opposition to the admittance of foreign
capital (even though coming from another EU member) by the host
nation. The last major attempt, before 2007, to create an institution that
effectively would operate in the entire continent was the acquisition
of the Dutch bank ABN by a consortium made up of the British Royal
Bank of Scotland, the Belgian Fortis, and the Spanish Santander.
Even though the pace of banking integration within Europe was
below expectations, it did increase from 2003 onwards. Schoenmaker
(2011) presents a cross-border penetration index for the EU banking
sector, made up of the percentage of a European bank’s assets that
are held by other EU nations. According to such data, the index went
from 12% in 1997 (therefore preceding the introduction of the Euro)
to approximately 20% in 2007, with the greatest increase being from
2003 on21. Salgado (2010) also points out the increase in cross-border
banking operations within the EU, particularly in the period from
2004 to 2007. Therefore, analysis of data shows an increase in ban-
king integration within the EU from the end of the 1990s until the
crisis of 2007.
This banking integration increased the systemic risk in Europe,
contributing to spread and exacerbate the crisis in the EU. In addi-
tion, there was a lack of a proper prevention-structure (regulation
and supervision) to mitigate and deal with crises22 (Geus, 2012).
However, banking integration proved to be uneven within the
EU, with definite differences between the so-called original members
(EU-15)23 and the new members24. According to Schoenmaker (2011),
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21 In regards to EU banking assets held by “third-parties”, levels remained relatively
constant throughout the entire period – at around 8%. For an in-depth look, see (2011).
22 This matter will be further analyzed in upcoming sections.
23 They are: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Nether-
lands, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
24 They are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic.
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new members’ banking systems are dominated by EU banks – in 1999,
63% of all assets in the sector were held by EU banks not from the host
country. On the other hand, in countries that were part of the original
EU (also known as EU-15), that percentage, in 1999, was 19%25. That
happens because those countries, especially the most important26
(such as Germany and France) have mature banking systems and ex-
perienced a relatively small entry of foreign capital in their systems –
despite the fact that both countries feature more capital from EU mem-
ber nations (19%) than other nations (7%). The author also points out
that the wholesale market is a lot more integrated then the retail mar-
ket, the latter being highly dependent on locally-established relation-
ships and on support from their branch networks.
Data presented by Schoenmaker (2011)27 shows that the level of
cross-border penetration28 in the European banking system was in-
deed impacted by the crisis. After showing signs of growth from
1997 (12%) to 2007 (20%), the level of cross-border penetration fell
in 2008 (19%), returning to 20% in 2009.
The scenario slightly changes when cross-border penetration of
assets from countries outside of the EU is taken into consideration.
Such levels were around 8% from 1997 to 2007, dropping in 2008 and
2009 to around 7%.
However, important differences within the EU must be pointed
out. New members’ banking systems are dominated – 63% in 2009 –
by other countries from the EU. As Schoenmaker (2011) notes, when
the crisis worsened in 2008, such countries proved to be relatively
more vulnerable given how open their banking systems were.
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25 However, it should be noted that the amount of banking assets held by countries that
are not EU members is very low: 4%. On the other hand, that figure for EU-15 Nations
jumps up to 24%.
26 Among the most important countries, the UK is an exception – only 48% of the assets
in its banking system were held domestically in 2009. Of the remaining assets, 27%
were held by banks from EU countries and 25% by other countries. Such data reinforces
London’s position as an important international financial centre.
27 The original data source is the European Central Bank.
28 In this case, measured by the volume of assets held by other countries’ Banks (mem-
bers of the EU or not), in relation to the countries’ volume of assets.
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The situation is dramatically different regarding the 15 original
EU Nations. Cross-border asset-penetration coming from other ori-
ginal nations is significantly lower: 19% in 2009. Even though the
group features some countries with a higher level of capital from
other members (such as Luxembourg, Finland, and Belgium), major
economies feature much lower cross border penetration rates: 10%
in Germany, France, and Spain, and 13% in Italy. The UK shows a
different tendency with a 27% rate for the same year (2009). Howe-
ver, it is widely known that London has established itself as an im-
portant international financial centre.
Cross-border penetration levels for capital originating outside
the Union is even lower for the EU-15 Countries – an average of 7%.
Levels for Luxembourg (10%) and the UK (24%) stand out. Regar-
ding the UK, Schoenmaker (2011) points out that the majority of ban-
king activities taking place in London are geared towards large
corporations and/or financial institutions (the so-called wholesale
market), activities which require higher levels of financial interna-
tionalization given the reduced need for a direct relationship with
clients and the ensuing lesser need for an extensive branch network.
Schoenmaker (2011) presents a list with the 30 largest European
banks29, sorting them according to their levels of transnationaliza-
tion. They are divided into: global banks, European Banks, and local
banks30. Data analysis shows that the number of European banks
grew from 7 in 2000 to 9 in 2010, a trend that was also noted in the
number of global banks – from 4 to 5.
According to the author, the five biggest banks in the European
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29 In a spectrum of approximately 8,400 banks in the EU in 2009, with the majority being
small banks operating in specific regions and/or countries. The 30 largest, determined
by the Tier 1 capital criteria, held half of all banking assets in the EU.
30 The level of transnationalization of a bank, originally presented in Schoenmaker and
Oosterloo (2005, apud Schoenmaker, 2011), is measured using the weighted average of
three indicators: assets, revenue, and number of employees. Therefore, a global bank
is one that does less than 50% of its business in its country of origin, and less than 25%
in the remainder of Europe. A European bank’s business is done less than 50% in its
country of origin, and more than 25% in the remainder of Europe. Finally, a local bank
is one that has more than 50% of its business concentrated in its country of origin.
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When it comes to the largest EU banks, their share remains rela-
tively constant throughout the analyzed period, keeping their posi-
tions when compared to banks from other countries. However, there
have been some changes regarding the main players in the process
of EU’s internationalization. Dutch ABN AMRO (seventh place in
the Unctad ranking in 2006) was acquired by a joint venture made
up of the Europeans RBS, Fortis, and Santander. Belgium’s Fortis,
eighteenth in the same Unctad ranking, went bankrupt during the
crisis and consequently shut down. British RBS, thirty-ninth in the
Union in 2009 were: BNP Paribas (France), Santander (Spain), Deut-
sche Bank (Germany), ING (Netherlands), and Nordea (Sweden).
The five most global banks in the EU, according to 2009 data, were:
HSBC (UK), Barclays (UK), UniCredit (Italy), BBVA (Spain), and
Standard Chartered (UK).
According to the Unctad ranking, the following is where those
institutions ranked as the most internationalized banking institu-
tions in the European Union in the period ranging from 2006 to
201131:
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31 According to the 2009 Unctad ranking, the five most internationalized institutions in
Europe were, in descending order: French BNP Paribas and Société Générale, Italian
UniCredit, British HSBC, and French Credit Agricole. Two of them are featured in the
ranking created by Schoenmaker (2011): HSBC and UniCredit.
TABLE 4












BNP/Paribas - France 4 2 11 2 2 3
Société Générale - France 8 11 6 5 5 7
Deutsche Bank - Germany 10 14 12 10 8 8
ING - Netherlands 11 13 19 14 15 17
UniCredit - Italy 12 9 9 7 9 9
Source: The top 50 financial TNCs - unctad.org.
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ranking, also had serious issues and was bailed-out by the UK go-
vernment, which became its majority owner. Since then, its assets
were greatly reduced32, and RBS has not been featured in the Unctad
ranking in the years of 2010 and 2011. Spanish Santander, on the
other hand, moved up a few spots on the ranking: it went from
twenty-second in 2006 to nineteenth in 2011.
5. Transformations in Banking Regulation
5.1 United States of America
The Glass Steagal Act, which had segmented the US banking sy-
stem, was repealed in 1999 under the argument that universal banks
gain economies of scope as they are allowed to operate in a variety
of financial activities. However, what was actually ascertained is that
large banks present an additional challenge to regulators and poli-
cymakers. Excessively large banks also have the lobbying power to
try to stop financial-system reforms. The financial crisis brought to
light the discussion about the need for new financial-system regu-
lation.
The reform of the US financial system, known as the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA), si-
gned by President Barack Obama on 21 June of 2010, features more
than 400 resolutions to restructure and change the way the financial
system works. Among the highlights of the Act, are:
i) Macro-prudential Concern: creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), responsible for defining the “syste-
mically relevant” financial institutions and with discretionary
power to supervise them, be they banks or non-banks.
ii) Volcker Rule: determines that institutions which have access to
the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort instruments and which have their
deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), cannot engage in proprietary trading, meaning they are
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32 See data presented in Schoenmaker (2011).
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not allowed to operate and speculate with their own assets in
buying and selling securities in capital markets.
iii) Collins Amendment: makes US Banks subject to the Basel III
Agreement, giving regulators the power to adjust capital requi-
rements.
iv) Derivatives Regulation: increases the percentage of derivatives
traded in the regulated environment of the stock markets, thus
decreasing over-the-counter trades.
v) Rating Agencies: to avoid conflicts of interest, agencies have to
be more transparent and become liable for its recommendations.
vi) Risk Retention: bond issuers have to keep at least 5% of the
bonds issued in their own balances, in order to avoid moral ha-
zard and to make the securitization process safer.
vii) Executive Compensation: banks have to disclose details about
their executives’ compensation.
viii) Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB):
the main goal of the CFPB is to better inform consumers before
they engage in financial contracts.
However, in spite of being approved by Congress in 2010, the
bill did not immediately go into effect. In fact, its effective imple-
mentation occurs in stages, as it requires the approval of an extensive
set of specific laws and the creation of new institutions. The initial
indication was that the legislative process would take from 6 to 18
months, starting from June 2009. However, it has been slower than
originally planned.
The FSOC is already in operation and since April of 2012 is au-
thorized to determine that non-banking institutions be supervised
by the Federal Reserve.
The “Volcker Rule” is one of the most controversial parts of the
DFA. On 17 December 2010, the American Bankers Association re-
leased a statement33 aimed at regulating authorities, in which it sta-
tes that: “it is important that the final rules not impair the availability
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of traditional banking services to bank customers, nor impose un-
necessary costs on banks, where there is no systemic risk or threat
to the U.S. financial system. Our members also will need to have suf-
ficient time and opportunity to modify their affected activities to
conform with the requirements of the final rules in a manner that is
not disruptive to customers or to the economy”.
Therefore, banks used their lobbying power to pressure regula-
tors into delaying the implementation of the Volcker Rule.
As for regulating derivatives, it may raise risks by increasing the
systemic importance of clearing houses (IMF, 2012). Regarding exe-
cutive compensation, according to Cohan (2012), American banks
still apply the same rules they were applying before the crisis.
Finally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created
in January 2012, and as of July 2012 the committee had already laun-
ched the “Know before you owe” program in order to increase tran-
sparency in the mortgage markets.
5.2 European Union
When it comes to new rules for the bank sector, the European
Union34 featured a movement similar to that in the United States.
Towards the end of 2008, just after emergency measures were taken
to tackle the crisis, the European Commission set up a work group
to make a diagnosis of the crisis, and especially to propose new mea-
sures aimed at preventing the occurrence of similar events (Deos,
2012).
The report made by the workgroup – the Larosière report – cal-
led for regulators and supervisors to work closer together, not only
in individual countries, but most importantly, in the context of the
European Union, given the high number of domestic regulators and
supervisors that worked in the EU, with a low level of coordination
between them. Among the report’s most important recommenda-
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34 We will not discuss specific regulation and supervision measures taken in the UK, a
member of the European Union but not of the Euro Zone.
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tions was the creation of a macro-prudential supervision authority
for the entire European Union (Deos, 2012).
In March of 2009, the European Commission accepted the re-
commendations made by the Larosière report and presented its new
proposal for the financial system, comprised of four main items: i)
improving regulation; ii) enhancing supervision; iii) increasing con-
sumer and investor protection; and iv) developing more effective
tools to manage crises (European Commission, 2011).
One of the most important elements of the reforms was the crea-
tion of a new architecture for financial supervision in Europe, both
in the level of institutions (micro) and in the macro-prudential level.
Hence, the European System for Financial Supervision (ESFS) was
created with three pillars: the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs), the National Supervisory Authorities, and the European Sy-
stemic Risk Board (ESRB). The new system is outlined below:
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PICTURE 1
European System of Financial Supervision Structure
Source: European Commission.
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The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) should come up
with the technical standards (prudential regulation) and promote
the cooperation and harmonization of supervision. They are made
up of the European Banking Authority (EBA), which focuses on
banks; the European Securities and Markets Authority (Esma), re-
sponsible bond market; and the European Insurance and Occupa-
tional Pensions Authority (Eiopa), which focus on insurance
companies and pension funds. They should report their activities to
the European Parliament and the European Commission. At the ope-
rational level, it was decided at first that the supervision would re-
main a task for local authorities (Geus, 2012).
Local authorities would be responsible for enacting supervisory
activities in their own countries, while the ESAs would be responsi-
ble for political coordination and for proposing sectorial rules.
Another element sitting atop of this new setup is the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), playing a macro-prudential role. The
Board members would be: the president and vice-president of the
European Central Bank, the presidents of the National Central
Banks, the presidents of the three European supervisory bodies, re-
presentatives of the European Commission, and representatives of
the national supervisory authorities, limited to one member per na-
tion. The ERSB must monitor any systemic imbalances, such as the
formation of asset bubbles, an increased concentration in the finan-
cial sector, or even an over-reliance on financial products deemed to
carry too much risk (Deos, 2012).
As far as regulation is concerned, the main feature is the intro-
duction of new Basel rules (Basel III). Several items were introduced:
i) specific liquidity requirements; ii) redefinition of capital, in order
to have “more and better” capital; iii) introduction of a leverage
index; iv) capital for counterpart credit risk; v) introduction of anti-
cyclical capital; and vi) introduction of additional capital for syste-
mically important institutions.
An important development took place in May 2012, when for the
first time the president of the European Counsel introduced the idea
of a banking union within the EU Countries. The union’s main ele-
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ments are: i) a single bank regulation for the entire EU; ii) an Euro-
pean banking supervisor; iii) common rules to prevent bank ban-
kruptcies; and iv) a shared system for deposit insurance (Geus, 2012).
In December of 2012, EU Finance Ministers closed a deal on esta-
blishing a new bank supervision model for the entire EU, taking the
first effective step in creating an European banking union. The Eu-
ropean Central bank (ECB) has the power to supervise European
banks35. For that to happen, the European Parliament drafted legi-
slation to put in place the new supervisory model – the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism.
6. Final Comments
The central goal of this article was to present and analyze the
main changes that took place after the crisis in the European and the
US financial systems with regard to concentration, internationaliza-
tion, and regulation of financial institutions.
In the United States, our analysis shows that, despite the increase
in concentration brought along by the deregulation process of the
1980s, the crisis sped up that process even more – assets held by the
largest banks increased significantly during the crisis – and the “too
big to fail” banks became even more powerful. It was also noted that
US banks remain among the world’s most important institutions.
On the other hand, the implementation of new rules for the financial
sector, known as the Dodd-Frank Act, has been extremely slow. Such
movements indicate that the “too big to fail” problem remains and
appears to have actually worsened. It is also clear that large institu-
tions remain much interconnected, with some institutions being ex-
posed to risk in financial products issued by others (Huffington Post,
2012).
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35 Those with a volume of assets over 30 billion Euros, representing over 20% of its
country’s GDP and/or which had already been bailed out by its government, which
would mean holding 75% to 85% of the total assets in the European banking system
(Véron, 2012).
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As far as the European Union is concerned, this paper showed
that the crisis brought about an increase in concentration, albeit at
lower levels when compared to the United States. The crisis also
shortly interrupted a cross-border movement of external capital into
the European banking system. After a tendency to grow from 1997
(cross-border penetration of 12%) until 2007 (around 20%), cross-
border penetration of assets originating in the EU dropped in 2008
(to 19%), having returned to 20% in 2009. The situation changes
when cross-border penetration of assets originating outside of the
EU is considered. This level remained at around 8% from 1997 until
2007, having dropped to 7% in 2008 and 2009.
It should be noted that new regulations feature increased levels
of capital requirements for systemically relevant institutions. Howe-
ver, in spite of being important, this approach carry its own risk. The
critique inspired by Hyman Minsky is very relevant at this point:
large crises are endogenously encouraged by increasing financial
fragility in the system, and not by unique events. Indeed, an increa-
sed level of required capital can contradictorily encourage riskier
behaviours. That means that the additional capital demanded by
Basel III could lead banks, especially the large and systemically re-
levant ones, to go back into shadow-banking activities or lower-cost
operations. However, since it will take some time for the new rules
to go into effect, it is too early to make a decisive analysis of the mat-
ter. It is possible that the decrease in leverage and the Basel III re-
quirements could lead banks to reduce their exposure outside the
home countries, which would reverse the internationalization pro-
cess of the financial system at some level (IMF, 2012). On the other
hand, new non-banking financial institutions could become more
important in the financial system, offering products to compete with
banks.
The 2012 Global Financial Stability Report featured some crucial
questions, which could be a starting point to discuss the evolution
of the banking system: how will banks react to the regulatory chan-
ges and to the low-interest rate environment? Will banks restructure
themselves and go back to providing more traditional services or
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will they search for new products, with greater risk, to increase their
profitability?
Given the complexity and the dynamic nature of financial sy-
stems, answers to the above questions should be constantly challen-
ged, and should never be considered definitive. However, both
recent history and the most adequate literature on the subject, such
as the “Minskyan” analysis, suggest there is a high potential for fra-
gility and instability, since there was not a significant restructuring
of the financial systems, which warrants permanent vigilance.
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